Searchable encryption has many applications including email systems and storage systems. The usefulness of searchable encryption derives from its support of keyword-testability. Keyword-testability means that a receiver of a ciphertext can test whether the ciphertext contains a specific keyword. Recently, Bellare et al. suggested an efficientlysearchable encryption scheme with keyword-recoverability as well as keyword-testability. Keyword-recoverability means that a receiver can extract the keyword from a ciphertext. All of the previous searchable encryption schemes have provided only keyword-testability. However, as explained by Bellare et al., no efficiently-searchable encryption scheme can provide even security against chosen keyword attacks. That is, Bellare et al.'s scheme assumes that no useful partial information about the keyword is known to the adversaries. In this paper, we suggest an SEKR (searchable encryption with keyword-recoverability) scheme which is secure even if the adversaries have any useful partial information about the keyword. Our scheme provides security against chosen ciphertext attacks which are stronger attacks than chosen keyword attacks. We also suggest an SEKR scheme for multi-keywords.
Introduction
With a public-key encryption scheme, a sender encrypts the message with a receiver's public key, and sends a ciphertext to the receiver. Then, the receiver with its private key decrypts the ciphertext, and gets the data. We call this functionality data-recoverability.
A notion of searchable encryption was suggested by Boneh et al. in [2] . With a searchable encryption scheme, a sender makes a ciphertext by encrypting a keyword with the public key of a receiver. The receiver can make a trapdoor for a keyword with a private key. Then any party can test whether or not the ciphertext and the trapdoor were made with the same keyword without knowing the keyword itself. We call this functionality keyword-testability.
A searchable encryption scheme might be used in e- mail systems. Suppose that an e-mail user wants to receive only such e-mails containing "urgent" as a keyword during his vacation. The user makes a trapdoor t urgent for "urgent" using its private key and stores t urgent to the email server. Let PE be a public-key encryption scheme and SE be a searchable encryption scheme. A sender sends c = (PE(m)||SE(KW)), where m is a data, and KW be a keyword for m. Then the server can test whether KW in SE(KW) is "urgent" with t urgent , while the server cannot know "urgent" itself. If the test is successful, the server sends c to the receiver. It is easy to see that the above trivial combination of public-key encryption and searchable encryption is not secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. In [4] , Baek et al. made secure schemes that provide data-recoverability and keyword-testability. And in [5] , Zhang and Imai made a generic scheme that provids data-recoverability and keyword-testability. Recently, Bellare et al. suggested an SEKR (searchable encryption with keyword-recoverability) scheme [1] . An SEKR scheme provides keyword-recoverability as well as keyword-testability. But the Bellare et al.'s SEKR scheme provides only weak security, PRIV-CCA (privacy against chosen ciphertext attacks), since their SEKR scheme is constructed to be an "efficiently-searchable" encryption scheme. PRIV-CCA assumes that no useful partial information about the keyword is known to the adversaries. We note that Bellare et al.'s SEKR scheme does not provide even IND-CKA (indistinguishability against chosen keyword attacks). It is noted that no efficiently-searchable encryption scheme can provide IND-CKA security in [1] .
In this paper, we suggest an SEKR scheme which is secure even if the adversaries have any useful partial information about the keyword. To do so, we first define a new security notion for SEKR schemes, IND-CCA (indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks), which implies PRIV-CCA and IND-CKA.
Constructing an IND-CCA-secure SEKR scheme is not trivial. Consider the following trivial SEKR scheme
which trivially appends to SE(KW) an encryption of a keyword PE(KW). The idea of the trivial scheme is to use SE(KW) for keyword-testability and PE(KW) for keywordrecoverability. Unfortunately, there are some problems with the trivial scheme. First, the trivial scheme is not secure Copyright c 2009 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers against chosen ciphertext attacks. Suppose that an adversary is trying to get information about keyword KW in SEKR(KW) = c = (A, B) . If the adversary can do chosen ciphertext attacks, the adversary can get a decryption of c = (A , B) c with an arbitrary string A . Thus, the adversary can know keyword KW in c. Second, the trivial scheme is not efficient. To make SEKR(KW), a sender might have to compute additional exponentiations depending on PE(KW).
Preliminaries
We use notation [a, b] for a set of integers from a to b. We use notation c ← S , if c is randomly selected from a set S . Bilinear Map. The definition of bilinear groups appears in [3] . Let G 1 be a group of prime order q. e is a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties:
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption. The CDH problem is as follows: given g, g
The CDH assumption is that all polynomial time algorithms have a negligible † advantage in solving CDH problem. Message Authentication Code (MAC). We use a strongly unforgeable MAC scheme under adaptive chosen-message attacks. A message authentication code (MAC) consists of M = (Mac, Vfy). Given a random key k, Mac computes a tag τ for a message m; we write this as τ ← Mac k (m). Vfy verifies the message-tag pair using the (shared) key, and returns 1 if the tag is valid or 0 otherwise. We require that for any key k and any message m, Vfy k (m, Mac k (m)) = 1. The MAC scheme M is strongly unforgeable, if any adversary cannot forge a valid message-tag pair which the adversary has not obtained. Random Oracle Model. Let H be a hash function such that H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} θ , where θ is the length of the results of the hash function. In the random oracle model, we assume that H is an idealized hash function and behaves as follows. Let x be a value queried to H. H keeps a table and answers to the query as follows: If (x, y) is in the table, H returns y as H(x). Otherwise, H selects a random number y from {0, 1}
θ . H stores (x, y) in the table and returns y as H(x).
Security Model
Let θ be a security parameter. Let E = (E.key, E.enc, E.td, E.test, E.dec) be an SEKR scheme. E.key(1 θ ) generates a pair of public-/private-keys (pk, sk), where θ is a security parameter. E.enc(pk, KW) produces an encryption of keyword KW with public key pk. E.td(sk, KW) produces trapdoor t KW with private key sk and keyword KW. E.test(pk, c, t KW ) outputs 1 if KW = KW and 0 otherwise, where c = E.enc(pk, KW) and t KW = E.td(sk, KW ). E.dec(sk, c) extracts keyword KW from ciphertext c with private key sk.
The correctness condition for E is as follows: For any keyword KW, if c = E.enc(pk, KW) and t KW = E.td(sk, KW) then E.test(pk, c, t KW ) = 1 and E.dec(sk, c) = KW.
The security for SEKR scheme, E, is formally defined using the following experiment:
In the above experiment an adversary A selects two keywords KW 0 and KW 1 in the find stage. A tries to correctly guess whether ciphertext c is an encryption of KW 0 
The advantage of A is defined as follows:
The advantage function is defined as follows:
where A is any adversary with time complexity t. E is IND-CCA secure, if the advantage of any adversary A with time complexity polynomial in θ is negligible. Definition for searchable encryption [2] . The definition and experiment for IND-CKA security in [2] are much the same as those for IND-CCA security of SEKR with the following constraint: A can ask for neither trapdoors for KW 0 and KW 1 nor any decryptions.
Our Scheme
Our SEKR construction is based on BCOP which is the Boneh's searchable encryption scheme [2] . BCOP.key(1 θ ) generates a pair of public-/private-keys (pk, sk), where θ is a security parameter. BCOP.enc(pk, KW) produces a searchable encryption for keyword KW. BCOP.td(sk, KW) produces a trapdoor t KW for keyword KW. BCOP.test(pk, c, t KW ) outputs 1 if KW = KW and 0 otherwise, where c = BCOP.enc(pk, KW) and t KW = BCOP.td(sk, KW ).
We now construct our SEKR scheme SEKR. We assume that KW ∈ {0, 1} . That is, we assume that the length of all keywords is -bit. Let H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , H 2 : G 2 → {0, 1} log 2 q , H 3 : G 1 → {0, 1} and H 4 : G 1 → {0, 1} log 2 q be hash functions. Our scheme, SEKR, works as follows:
• SEKR.key(1 θ ): The input security parameter determines the size, q, of the groups G 1 and G 2 , where q † If function f is negligible, for any constant k, there exists
is a prime order of the groups. The algorithm picks a random α ∈ Z * q and a generator g of G 1 . It outputs pk = [g, h = g α ] and sk = α.
• SEKR.enc(pk, KW): The algorithm first computes a = e(H 1 (KW), h r ) and k = H 4 (h r ) for a random r ∈ Z * q . The algorithm outputs
where ⊕ is an exclusive-or operation.
• SEKR.td(sk, KW): The algorithm outputs t KW 
Security Analysis
We now prove the security of our suggested scheme SEKR in the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
If M is a strongly unforgeable MAC scheme and BCOP is an IND-CKA-secure searchable encryption scheme, SEKR is an IND-CCA-secure SEKR scheme in the random oracle model.
Proof of Theorem 1. We will show that if an adversary
A breaks the IND-CCA security of SEKR, A has to break the underlying MAC scheme M, the CDH assumption, or the IND-CKA security of BCOP. Let A be an algorithm which breaks the IND-CCA security with a non-negligible advantage.
We define an event AskCDH as follows: In an IND-CCA experiment, A asks H 3 or H 4 for h log g A with a given challenge ciphertext (A, B, C, D) .
Then, a probability that A correctly guesses b in an experiment is as follows:
We first state three claims to prove the theorem. From Claim 2 and Claim 3, the following equation holds: For a ciphertext (A , B , C , D ) , the MAC key is k = H 4 (h log g A ), where h is a public key. Without asking h log g A to H 4 , an adversary has no information about k in the random oracle model. Without information about k, the adversary cannot make a valid MAC, since the underlying MAC scheme M is secure. †
Proof of Claim 2.
If an event AskCDH occurs, an adversary A asks H 3 or H 4 for h log g A with a given challenge ciphertext (A, B, C, D) , where h is a public key. Let (g, 
So the claim is proved as follows:
Extensions to SEKR for Multi-Keywords
We now construct mSEKR which is our SEKR scheme for multi-keywords. We assume that KW ∈ {0, 1} . That is, we assume that the length of all keywords is -bit. Let H 1 :
log 2 q be hash functions. Our scheme, mSEKR, works as follows:
• mSEKR.key(1 θ ): The input security parameter determines the size, q, of the groups G 1 and G 2 , where q is a prime order of the groups. The algorithm picks a random α ∈ Z * q and a generator g of G 
Theorem 2.
If M is a strongly unforgeable MAC scheme and BCOP is an IND-CKA-secure searchable encryption scheme, mSEKR is an IND-CCA-secure SEKR scheme for multi-keywords in the random oracle model.
Proof of Theorem 2.
The proof of Theorem 2 is almost same with that of Theorem 1, so we omit the proof.
Conclusions
We have defined IND-CCA security for SEKR (searchable encryption with keyword-recoverability) which implies PRIV-CCA and IND-CKA. We have then constructed an IND-CCA-secure SEKR scheme, SEKR. We have also extended SEKR into mSEKR which is an SEKR scheme for multi-keywords.
